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Climate challenges in Russia
Russia is responsible for 4.7% of global greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions, behind China (27.5%), the 
United States (14.7%) and India (7.3%). According 
to data from 2018, the total amount of emissions 
reached 1.63 billion tonnes of CO2: this figure was 
obtained after deducting the pollutants absorbed 
by forests and land (c. 590.6 million tonnes in 
2018). The main share in environmental pollution 
belongs to the energy sector, with around 79%. 
The share of other areas of the economy in green-
house gas emissions is significantly less: industry 
(10.9%), agriculture (5.7%), waste management 
(4.4%).1 Although the level of GHG emissions in 
Russia is much lower than it was in the last years 
of the USSR’s existence (about 3.1 billion tons 
of CO2 emissions in 1990), over the last decade 
a slight but consistent increase has been observed. 
In addition, emissions of methane in Russia are 
systematically increasing, which among all green-
1 Greenhouse gas emissions in Russia in 2018, by source, 
Statista, www.statista.com.
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house gases has a particularly negative impact on 
climate change. In 2018, its emissions exceeded 
the 1990 level by 6%.2 According to data from 
the International Energy Agency, the Russian oil 
and gas sector is responsible for 15.2% of the 
world’s methane emissions, which are attributable 
to companies operating in the oil and gas market. 
Almost 60% of them result from deliberate actions 
taken by the companies, and are a consequence 
of the methods used in Russia to extract energy 
resources from onshore deposits, including the 
combustion of gas accompanying oil extraction.3
Global climate change is taking place at a faster 
pace in Russia than the world average. For exam-
ple, the average rise in global temperature over 
the past 10 years has been 0.18°C. In the case of 
Russia, it has reached the level of 0.47°C, and in 
the Russian part of the Arctic it is as high as 0.8°C. 
Some forecasts indicate that by the middle of the 
21st century, the average summer air temperature 
in Russia may rise by 2–3 or even 3–4°C.4
The consequences of climate change 
for the Russian economy
Although climate change does create some op-
portunities for the development of certain sectors 
of the Russian economy, it is unlikely that these 
can compensate for the serious losses reported 
by both experts and some government officials.
A temperature rise would increase the accessibility 
of the Northern Sea Route, which Russia sees as 
a promising transport route. Back in the 1990s, 
the period of free navigation along this route was 
about two months, but now navigation is possi-
ble for up to four months a year. This translates 
2 The energy sector, in particular companies operating in 
the oil and gas market (40%), is the most responsible for 
methane emissions. Of this, the main sources of environ-
mental pollution are activities in the sectors of transport 
and storage (61%); extraction accounts for 17%.
3 А. Лопатников, ‘Нулевой углеродный след: риски 
и возможности для нефтегазовой отрасли’, Нефтегазой 
вертикал, no. 19, 2020, pp. 69–80.
4 T. Митрова, A. Хохлов, Ю. Мельников, A. Пердеро, M. 
Мельникова, E. Залюбовский, Глобальная климатическая 
угроза и экономика России: в поисках особого пути, 
Сколково, May 2020, energy.skolkovo.ru.
into a real increase in the amount of transported 
goods, the volume of which rose from 6.5 million 
tons in the 1980s to 20.1 million tons in 2018 and 
31.5 million tons in 2019. According to the assump-
tions of the latest Strategy for the Development of 
the Russian Arctic Zone and Provision of National 
Security Through 2035, transport volume could 
rise to 130 million tons during this time. Global 
warming may also facilitate the implementation of 
new extraction projects in the oil and gas sector, 
especially for deposits located in the Arctic shelf.
At the same time, the scale of the real and po-
tential economic losses associated with climate 
change outweigh the possible benefits. According 
to economists’ estimates, the Russian Federation 
may currently lose about 30–60 billion roubles 
a year (US$390–780 million) to climate change. 
In 2019, Aleksandr Krutikov, deputy minister for 
the development of the Far East and the Arctic, 
estimated during an interview with Bloomberg 
that the current losses of the Russian economy 
due to global warming amount to between 50 and 
150 billion roubles annually (from US$650 million 
to about 2 billion). In November 2020, in his speech 
to the Federation Council’s Arctic and Antarctic 
Council, he noted that by 2050 Russia’s total eco-
nomic losses in the Arctic region could amount 
to between 2 and 9 trillion roubles (from US$27 
to 121 billion dollars).5 In turn, the then Minister 
of Natural Resources of Russia, Sergei Donskoy, 
estimated in June 2015 that by 2030 Russia could 
lose as much as 1–2% of GDP annually as a result 
of climate change.6
A warming climate threatens infrastructure sus-
tainability, among other things. According to es-
5 ‘В Минвостокразвия оценили прямой ущерб от глобаль-
ного потепления в Арктике’, ТАСС, 24 November 2020, 
www.tass.ru.
6 ‘Донской: РФ может терять до 2% ВВП ежегодно из-за 
изменения климата’, РИА Новости, 19 June 2015, www.
ria.ru.
By 2050 Russia’s total economic loss-
es in the Arctic region could amount 
to between US$27 and 121 billion 
dollars.
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timates presented by the Bloomberg agency, the 
current trend of temperature rise may lead to the 
destruction or damage of c. 20% of the infra-
structure facilities located in permafrost areas (in-
cluding residential buildings, pipelines and other 
critical energy infrastructure) worth c. US$84 bil-
lion. This is a serious challenge to the operation 
of many companies in industry and the mining 
sector; about 15% of oil and 80% of gas in Russia 
are currently extracted in permafrost areas. Tem-
perature warming leading to rises in the levels of 
rivers and groundwater may, in turn, pose a threat 
to pipeline networks: around 50,000 km of oil 
pipelines and around 150,000 km of gas pipelines 
cross by rivers and other watercourses. The agri-
cultural sector may also be hit by substantial losses 
as a result of climate change. Successive droughts 
may lead to soil desertification and a reduction 
in grain production, which will adversely affect 
Russia’s food security and the prospects for Rus-
sian exports in this area. In addition, regular rises 
in temperatures may systematically increase the 
risk of forest fires, which already pose a serious 
challenge to the Russian authorities.
Russia and its international climate 
obligations
Although Russia participates in international co-
operation mechanisms on climate issues, it has 
not undertaken any very ambitious commitments 
in this regard. The Russian Federation is a party 
to the Framework Convention for the Protection 
of Climate Change adopted in June 1992. It also 
acceded to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, under which 
the signatory states made binding commitments 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the first 
time. Moscow also regularly participates in all 
the negotiation rounds of the Conference of the 
Parties to the 1992 Convention. In September 
2019, Russia ratified the so-called Paris Agreement 
adopted at the UN Climate Change Conference 
in December 2015.
At the same time, however, the scale of Russia’s 
commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
is not very ambitious, and has not required the 
state to take any significant measures in the most 
emissive areas of the economy. The main reason 
for this is the low benchmark for Russian reduction 
commitments. The volume of greenhouse gas 
emissions in 1990 reached a record level in the 
history of the USSR and Russia, of 3.1 billion tons of 
CO2. Both in the 1990s and in the 21
st century, peak 
emissions slightly exceeded 1.6 billion tonnes of 
CO2 (values  obtained after deducting GHG uptake 
by forests and land). Therefore, the commitment 
in the Kyoto Protocol to maintain emissions in 
the years 2008–2012 at a level not exceeding 
the values  from 1990 posed no challenge to the 
state’s policy. The contribution (voluntary, legally 
non-binding obligation) declared by Russia under 
the so-called of the Paris Agreement of 2015 is also 
not very ambitious: Russia declared its intention 
to maintain greenhouse gas emissions at a level 
below 70–75% of the 1990 ceiling in the period 
from 1 January 2020 to 31 December 2030.7 An-
other inexpensive declaration is the target which 
Vladimir Putin announced in November 2020 to re-
duce CO2 emissions to 70% of 1990 emissions 
by 2030. According to data for 2018, the emission 
level amounted to less than 1.63 billion tonnes, 
which is around 52.4% of 1990 emissions (see 
Chart 1 in the Appendix). Russia’s withdrawal from 
making any binding commitments was a further 
illustration of its protective attitude towards the 
Kyoto Protocol’s prescriptions. The unambitious 
reduction targets effectively open the way to in-
creasing the level of greenhouse gas emissions in 
Russia over the coming decades.
Climate issues a low priority 
in domestic politics
Climate issues have not yet been treated in Russia 
as a strategic area of  the state’s internal policy. 
This is mainly due to the focus on improving gen-
eral economic indicators, enabling the increase of 
profits by the political and business elites which 
control strategic sectors of the economy, and en-
abling the fulfilment of social obligations towards 
society. At the same time, pressure from the oil 
and gas lobby and the reluctance to introduce 
7 INDCs as communicated by Parties, INDC, www.unfccc.int.
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costly systemic changes are pushing the resolution 
of climate problems into the background.8
The strategic documents adopted so far and the 
statements made by senior government repre-
sentatives indicate that Moscow does not intend 
to join the group of countries which treat climate 
issues as a priority in the coming years and have 
declared their intention to achieve climate neu-
trality in the next few decades.9 In the latest draft 
of the Long-term Development Strategy with 
Low Greenhouse Gas Emissions to 2050, Russia 
plans to reduce CO2 emissions to 67% of 1990 
values  by 2030, and to 64% by 2050. Although 
the document assumes as many as four different 
scenarios for achieving this, depending on the 
level of state involvement in the implementation 
of climate policy goals, even in its most optimistic 
variant Russia could not achieve climate neutrality 
any earlier than the end of this century. Also, the 
decree which Putin signed on 4 November 2020 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions assumes that 
Russia will reduce pollution levels by 30% by 2030 
compared to 1990.10 The plan for the first stage of 
measures to adapt the economy and population 
to climate change is also very general in nature. 
Nor is there much evidence that the provisions 
of the law on the state regulation of greenhouse 
gas emissions, which have been in the pipeline 
for many months, are more ambitious.
Moscow is trying to use some of its objective 
geographic advantages as excuses for unambi-
8 This has been confirmed inter alia by an interview with 
Ruslan Edelgeriyev, Vladimir Putin’s main climate policy 
adviser. He suggested that some Russian companies prefer 
individual, short-term interests over the long-term goal of 
a low-carbon economy in Russia. See ‘Russia Sets Ambitious 
Targets for Low-Carbon Future’, Energy Intelligence, 20 Au-
gust 2020, www.energyintel.com.
9 Apart from the European Union, several other countries 
plan to achieve climate neutrality by 2050. Among the most 
significant are Japan and South Korea. For its part, China 
has declared its intention to achieve this target by 2060.
10 Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 04/11/2020 г. 
№ 666 О сокращении выбросов парниковых gasoline, 
Президент России, 4 November 2020, www.kremlin.ru.
tious measures to decarbonise the economy. One 
example is the argument that Russia’s large forest 
resources have a positive impact on mitigating the 
effects of climate change. Government officials 
have repeatedly pointed out that Russia accounts 
for 70% of the world’s boreal forests and 25% 
of the world’s total forests. As a result, Russia is 
reducing its annual net greenhouse gas emissions 
by around 27%.
Russian companies’ ‘climate 
awakening’
The rising importance of climate challenges is 
beginning to attract the attention and interest 
of Russian companies. On one hand this is being 
reflected in changing business strategies, although 
on the other, the current balance of the activities 
Russian energy companies are undertaking in the 
field of climate challenges is not very impressive, 
especially when compared to the activity of large 
international energy companies.11
Tatneft is so far the only Russian energy compa-
ny that has unequivocally declared an intention 
to achieve climate neutrality by 2050.12 LUKoil, 
Russia’s largest private oil producer, is also plan-
ning to adopt a strategy aimed at achieving this 
goal by 2050.13 Several other companies are also 
adopting strategies to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, but they are much less ambitious. 
RUSAL, Russia’s largest aluminium producer, plans 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 15% in its 
aluminium plants and 10% in its alumina produc-
tion facilities by 2025. In 2018 the Arkhangelsky 
CBK company adopted a low-emission develop-
11 One example illustrating the much greater involvement of 
international energy companies in the implementation of 
the climate agenda is the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative, 
established in 2014, which groups 12 major global energy 
companies: BP, Chevron, CNPC, Eni, Equinor, ExxonMobil, 
Occidental, Petrobras, Repsol, Saudi Aramco, Shell and 
Total. The companies linked in this group have brought 
about a cumulative reduction of methane emissions by 9%, 
and by 2025 they plan to reduce that figure by 20%.
12 The reduction is to take place gradually: by 10% by 2025, 
and by 25% by 2030. In 2019, Tatneft’s greenhouse gas 
emissions amounted to 120.5 million tonnes.
13 В. Sidorovich, ‘ЛУКОЙЛ хочет стать углеродно-нейтраль-
ным к 2050 году, «как и вся Европа»’, RenEn, 9 March 
2020, www.renen.ru.
The scale of Russia’s commitments 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
is not very ambitious.
OSW Commentary     NUMBER 369 5
ment strategy to 2030, in which it undertook 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 55% com-
pared to the 1990 level, i.e. to around 1.4 million 
tonnes of CO2 annually.
14 SIBUR is one of the few 
Russian companies to have declared an interest in 
implementing a sustainable development strategy; 
it is taking steps to reduce CO2 emissions, mod-
ernise its chemical processing plants with a view 
to taking ecological requirements into account, 
and to reprocess plastics.
It is hard to accurately assess the activity of the 
largest Russian state-controlled energy compa-
nies. Both Rosneft and Gazprom have noted im-
provements in greenhouse gas emission levels in 
their official announcements, but this has not yet 
translated into comprehensive changes in these 
companies’ operating strategies. On one hand 
Rosneft, the largest producer and exporter of Rus-
sian oil, has taken a number of measures to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions in recent years. In 2019, 
the company reduced methane emissions from 
its mining projects by as much as 73% year on 
year. In the period 2014–2019, Rosneft increased 
the level of utilisation of so-called associated 
gas15 to 93.8%, which significantly reduced the 
amount of raw material burned in oil extraction. 
GHG emissions in the processing sector also fell 
(by 11% year on year in 2018). On the other hand, 
however, Rosneft perceives investments in renew-
able energy sources negatively, and its long-term 
development strategy is based on the assumption 
that the share of oil in the global energy mix will 
continue to rise. It assumes that by 2040 global 
demand for crude oil will increase to 106 million 
barrels per day. In addition, the scale of Rosneft’s 
so-called green investment is much lower than 
that of large international energy companies. 
Rosneft plans to allocate around US$4 billion 
14 T. Митрова, A. Хохлов, Ю. Мельников, A. Пердеро, M. 
Мельникова, E. Залюбовский, Глобальная климатическая 
угроза…, op. cit.
15 Gas extracted during oil production. 
by 2025 for this purpose; in comparison, Shell and 
Total have been investing around US$1.5–2 billion 
annually in so-called green projects.
The fledgling RES sector
The Russian government has not so far been treat-
ing the development of renewable energy sources 
as a priority,16 which has translated into a low 
share for them in Russia’s energy mix (0.15%).17 
Admittedly, it has adopted a support program for 
renewable energy in 2013;18 however, its effects 
have fallen below the expected results. Thus, the 
government has planned to increase the share of 
renewable energy sources in the national energy 
mix to 4.5% in 202419 – nevertheless, this goal is 
completely unrealistic. This is confirmed by the 
new Russian Federation Energy Strategy to 2035, 
which shows that the share of renewable energy 
sources in Russian electricity production will not 
exceed 1% in the next decade.
While many international oil companies are inten-
sively involved in developing renewable energy 
projects, most large Russian energy companies 
treat this sector as a marginal field of activity, 
and some are openly opposed to making invest-
ments in this area. LUKoil is the most involved in 
developing renewable energy projects in Russia: 
the company has so far launched one solar power 
plant to power its Volgograd refinery, and LUKoil 
also runs three solar power plants in Romania and 
Bulgaria (with a total capacity of 10 MW) and 
one wind farm in Romania (84 MW). In October 
2020, the company started the construction of 
two solar power plants in Volgograd (20 MW) 
16 Russia only joined the International Agency for Renewable 
Energy Sources in autumn 2014.
17 The RES sector includes solar and wind power plants, 
low-power hydroelectric plants (up to 25 MW) and biomass 
power plants. 
18 Many major international energy companies are involved 
in projects related to the use of renewable energy sourc-
es: these include Total, BP, Equinor, Repsol, Shell, Eni and 
Chevron. 
19 Распоряжение Правительства РФ от 08.01.2009 N 1 р “Об 
основных направлениях государственной политики 
в сфере повышения энергетической эффективности 
электроэнергетики на основе использования возоб-
новляемых источников энергии”, КОДИФИКАЦИЯ РФ, 
www.rulaws.ru.
Some Russian companies are begin-
ning to take climate questions into 
consideration in their development 
strategies.
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and Krasnodar (2.5 MW). GazpromNeft, a com-
pany controlled by Gazprom, has one solar power 
plant with a small generation capacity (1 MW), 
which produces electricity for the needs of its 
own refinery in Omsk. Zarubezhneft has also de-
clared a preliminary interest in renewable energy 
projects, but the company has so far limited itself 
to analysing the profitability of implementing 
such plans.20
Forecast
Although the Russian government has start-
ed to show greater interest in climate issues, 
we should not expect any revolutionary changes in 
terms of real actions over the next few years. First, 
the planned regulatory solutions do not provide 
for strict measures to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions. The bills prepared which concern pollution 
reduction assume the voluntary participation of 
companies in implementing climate projects. The 
state is to monitor the implementation of projects 
aimed at reducing emissions, but there are no 
plans to introduce more stringent instruments, 
such as the so-called carbon tax. Secondly, the 
Russian government has a different hierarchy of 
priorities, which is a significant barrier. For those 
in charge, it is of key importance to ensure finan-
cial stability, which is the main challenge in the 
context of volatile energy commodity markets. 
Third, resistance from influential representatives of 
the political and business elite, who are primarily 
interested in maximising their profits from the 
current model of the Russian economy, may also 
prove to be a significant barrier.
There is no certainty that Russia will manage to sig-
nificantly increase its renewable energy potential 
in the medium and long term. In 2020, the Russian 
government decided to extend the programme of 
20 Д. Мельник, ‘ВИЭ наступают. Крупнейшие компании 
в эпоху енергетического перехода’, Нефтегазовая 
вертикаль, no. 20, 2020, pp. 34–43.
financial support for the expansion of generation 
capacity based on renewable energy sources until 
2035, but it remains an open question as to how 
much money will ultimately be allocated to de-
velop this sector in Russia. The government plan 
provides for a total financial outlay of 400 billion 
roubles, of which 231.25 billion roubles is for 
wind farms, 138.75 billion roubles for solar power 
plants and 30 billion roubles for small hydroelectric 
plants; estimates are that these measures will raise 
generation capacity based on RES by 7–9 GW until 
2035. However, in autumn 2020 the Russian media 
began to report that the programme to finance 
RES projects may eventually be reduced by 50%, 
and amount to just 200 billion roubles.
One factor that may motivate Russia to introduce 
certain changes is the actions taken by states or 
international organisations which affect export 
markets which are strategic for Russia, in par-
ticular the European Union. The EU’s gradual 
implementation of the European Green Deal con-
cept – based on the consistent pursuit of climate 
neutrality in 2050, and including instruments 
such as increasing the share of renewable energy 
sources in the energy mix, the development of 
hydrogen energy, or the use of fiscal instruments 
(the so-called carbon tax) – may force Russian to 
make certain adjustments to its actions. Repre-
sentatives of the Russian government and energy 
companies are discussing this issue with Western 
European partners. According to some estimates, 
the introduction of anti-emission fiscal solutions 
could lose Russian exporters between US$14 and 
30 billion a year. However, minimising this risk 
would require decisive, systemic action by the 
Russian authorities, which so far have not been 
planned. It is also unclear whether the threat of 
losing markets is enough to force the key Rus-
sian energy companies to make radical changes 
to their own development strategies, which are 
still based on conservative forecasts of growth in 
fossil fuel demand.
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APPENDIX
Chart 1. Greenhouse gas emissions in the USSR and Russia in 1985–2019.
Source: Carbon dioxide emissions volume in Russia from 1985 to 2019, Statista, 10 November 2020, www.statista.com. 
Chart 2. Greenhouse gas emissions in Russia by sectors in 2018
Source: Greenhouse gas emissions in Russia in 2018, Statista, 7 December 2020, www.statista.com.
Table. Development of RES generation capacity in Russia in 2014–2019 (in MW)
Year Total installed capacity 
of RES-powered power plants 
in that year
Expansion of generation capacity in that year
solar wind small hydroelectric plants
planned implemented planned implemented planned implemented
2014 136 35 - - - - -
2015 198 140 55 51 7 - -
2016 270 199 70 50 2 - -
2017* 795 250 104 200 35 21 -
2018 1137 270 290 400 50 - -
2019 1730 270 594 500 - 50 -
*From 2017, the total installed capacity of RES-powered power plants includes solar and wind farms in Russia-occupied Crimea. 
Source: Рынок возобновляемой энергетики России: текущий статус и перспективы развития, АРВЭ, May 2020, www.rreda.ru.















243.1 126.7 97.7 -590.6
energy sector industry agriculture waste management
pollution absorbed
by forests and land
[million tons of CO2 equivalent]
